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ABSTRACT

The private sector historically has driven the setting of technical
standards in the United States, with the federal government only
intervening in response to perceived violations of specific statutes, such
as antitrust laws. This concern is reflected in case law and in advice
proffered by US antitrust enforcers. Recently, however, US enforcers
have turned their attentionprimarily to the alleged misuse of monopoly
power over patents that cover technologies embodied in standards.
This new focus threatens to undermine innovation and departs from
sound antitrust enforcement policy. American antitrust enforcers
should redirect their priorities away from alleged single-firm,
patent-relatedabuses associated with standardsetting and toward the
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traditional emphasis on reductions in rivalrous competition. They
should also reject their recently adopted skeptical attitude toward
patents and return to the former consensus, understanding that the
exercise of patent rights generally promotes innovation and strengthens
the competitive process.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

This Article discusses the recent undermining of patent rights
by the Obama administration, which has manifested in various ways,
particularly in the context of standard-setting policy and antitrust
policy. Continuation of this policy, which unfortunately is mirrored in
Europe and East Asia, 1 would prove harmful over time to the US
innovation-based economy.
Patent laws enjoy a venerable place in US jurisprudence.
Specifically, the Patent and Copyright Clause of the Constitution
empowers Congress "[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful
Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries." 2 In The
FederalistNo. 43, James Madison justified the protection of "Writings"
and "Discoveries" as contributing both to the public interest and to the
See generally Paul Lugard, Simina Suciu & Elena Cortds, European Union:
1.
Assessment of IP Licensing Agreements under EU Competition Law, in GETTING THE DEAL
http://www.law.georgetown.edu/cle/materials/Antitrustl5/IP/5/
(2014),
5
5,
THROUGH
Getting the deal throughLicensing_2014.pdf [http://perma.cc/CJ4M-QDZQ] ("In recent years
there has been ...an increasing willingness of the European Commission ...and other antitrust
enforcement agencies to challenge IP-related transactions, often on the basis of novel theories of
competitive harm.").
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.8.
2.

2016]

US GOVERNMENT ANTITRUST INTERVENTION

227

private interest of creators-"[t]he public good fully coincides in both
3
cases with the claims of individuals."
Patent law does not exist in a vacuum. In particular, federal
courts often are asked to construe patent doctrines in tandem with

antitrust law principles in high profile disputes regarding the
application of valuable technologies. Though not mentioned in the
Constitution, antitrust laws have long been seen as holding a special

status in the federal statutory hierarchy. The US Supreme Court, for
example, famously stated that "[a]ntitrust laws in general, and the
'4
Sherman Act in particular, are the Magna Carta of free enterprise.
Today, US antitrust law is often broadly viewed as aimed at
promoting "consumer welfare" and "economic efficiency." 5 It typically

does this by forbidding business behavior that harms the competitive
process or lacks countervailing efficiency justifications. 6 Concern
typically focuses on "bad" actions-business behavior that is not

"competition on the merits. ' 7 Certain conduct-"naked" cartel activity

lacking any efficiency justification, such as secret price fixing or bid
rigging-is deemed categorically illegal, or unlawful per se, without
regard to possible efficiency justifications. Conduct that is not per se
illegal is assessed under a "rule of reason," which requires a more

detailed analysis of particular practices. 8 US antitrust law does not,
3.
THE HERITAGE GUIDE TO THE CONSTITUTION 153 (David F. Forte & Matthew
Spalding eds., 2d ed. 2014).
United States v. TopcoAssocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972).
4.
The precise goals of antitrust are a rather complicated topic beyond the scope of this
5.
Article, but the merits of "economic efficiency" and "consumer welfare" clearly are a central
feature of modern US antitrust policy debates (even though other factors are also discussed and
there are disagreements as to definitions of terms). For an excellent overview of these debates
and US antitrust philosophy in general, see HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLIcY
57-86 (4th ed. 2011). For an excellent description of relevant scholarly literature in this area, see
Jonathan M. Jacobson, Partner, Wilson Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati, Another Take on the
Relevant Welfare Standard for Antitrust, Remarks at The Chair's Showcase: Rethinking
Antitrust Economics for the 21st Century, Am. Bar Ass'n Antitrust Section Spring Meeting (Apr.
[https://perma.cc/
16, 2015), https:/iwww.wsgr.comlattorneys/BIOS/PDFs/acobson-0415.pdf
V6RB-Q3961.
Jacobson, supra note 4, presents a good discussion of competing standards for
6.
evaluating potential antitrust violations, including the treatment of efficiencies and the meaning
of harm to the competitive process.
This is a slight overstatement. Antitrust law prohibits mergers that, while
7.
otherwise involving perfectly legitimate business objectives, "may . . . substantially lessen
competition or ... tend to create a monopoly." Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 7 (2012). Mergers, which
play a prominent role in corporate conduct, are only "bad acts" in an antitrust sense if their
effects raise these statutory concerns. See also United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 233 F. Supp.
976, 979 (S.D. Cal. 1964) ("The act was intended to prevent a merger or acquisition of assets
when the effect may be to substantially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly.").
For a more nuanced overview of the distinction between the per se rule and the rule
8.
of reason (with an emphasis on the characterization of business practices that informs this
distinction), see HOVENKAMP, supra note 5, at 272-89.
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however, prohibit the mere exercise of legitimately obtained market
power-that is, the mere charging of "high" prices by firms that
succeed through merits-based competition.9 As the Supreme Court
emphasized in Verizon v. Trinko:
The mere possession of monopoly power, and the concomitant charging of monopoly
prices, is not only not unlawful; it is an important element of the free-market system.
The opportunity to charge monopoly prices-at least for a short period-is what attracts
'business acumen' in the first place; it induces risk taking that produces innovation and
economic growth. To safeguard the incentive to innovate, the possession of monopoly
power will not be found unlawful unless it is accompanied by an element of
anticompetitive conduct. 10

II.

THE HISTORY OF THE PATENT-ANTITRUST INTERFACE

Patent law and antitrust law have had an uneasy relationship
over the years largely based on the discredited notion that patent law
inherently promotes monopoly, while antitrust is designed to combat
monopoly.
Since the enactment of the Sherman Antitrust Act in 1890, the
legal treatment of licensing practices based on patent rights has
oscillated between absolute freedom in licensing and significant
limitations. In the early 1900s, patent laws were considered to give
"absolute freedom in the use or sale of rights."'" However, in the
ensuing decades, the courts recognized limitations on the extent of a
patent owner's rights in licensing. In United States v. Line Material
Co., the Supreme Court emphasized that inventors must stay within
their "statutory exclusive rights," which include the "rights of an
inventor to make, use, and sell products of his invention for a limited
time."'12 The Court pointed out that "[a]s long as the inventors kept
within their statutory exclusive rights, they were not engaging in
unreasonable restraints of trade violating the Sherman Act," but
added that "[t]he Sherman Act unquestionably applied to any abuse of
a patentee's exclusive rights which exceeded the limit of those
rights.' 3 The Court adopted a narrow interpretation of patent law
rights in favor of the antitrust laws, noting in Sears, Roebuck & Co. v.
Stiffel Co., that "[o]nce the patent issues, it is strictly construed, it
cannot be used to secure any monopoly beyond that contained in the

9.
See, e.g., Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 294 (2d Cir. 1979)
("Setting a high price may be a use of monopoly power, but it is not in itself anticompetitive.").
10.
Verizon Commc'ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 407
(2004).
11.
See E. Bement & Sons v. Nat'l Harrow Co., 186 U.S. 70, 91 (1902) ("[T]he general
rule is absolute freedom in the use or sale of rights under the patent laws of the United States.").
12.
United States v. Line Materials Co., 333 U.S. 287, 341 (1948).
13.
Id.
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patent, the patentee's control over the product when it leaves his
hands is sharply limited, and the patent monopoly may not be used in
disregard of the antitrust laws." 14 In other words, a patentee cannot

legally engage in conduct that violates antitrust norms if such conduct
goes beyond the core time-limited right to make, use, and sell his
patented product-as the Supreme Court put it, "The patent laws
which give a temporary monopoly on 'making, using, or selling the
invention' are in pari materia with the antitrust laws, and modify
'
them pro tanto."

15

The Court's jurisprudence defined certain types of conduct
involving patents to be per se violations of the antitrust laws. In
Mercoid Corp. u. Mid-Continent Investment Co., the Court held that
tying arrangements involving patents always constituted antitrust

violations.1 6 The Court stated:
When the patentee ties something else to his invention, he acts only by virtue of his
right as the owner of property to make contracts concerning it and not otherwise. He
then is subject to all the limitations upon that right which the general law imposes upon
such contracts. The contract
is not saved by anything in the patent laws because it
17
relates to the invention.

In the 1970s, the Antitrust Division of the US Department of
Justice (DOJ) went beyond existing case law and delineated nine
types of patent licensing restrictions that it would challenge, without
regard to their potential efficiencies: the "Nine No-Nos" of licensing.1 8
The "No-Nos" sought to render invalid virtually all of a patent holder's
contractual limitations on the use of its technology by "downstream"
licensees. The "No-Nos" ignored the licensing restraints' role in
developing potential gains in technology specialization, adoption, and
further technological improvement investment incentives.
In practice, only a few of the IP cases filed by the Antitrust
Division addressed any of these nine restrictions, and most of those
cases were litigated under a rule of reason rather than per se
illegality. 19 Nevertheless, the existence of such a highly publicized list
undoubtedly discouraged potentially efficient, welfare-increasing
patent licensing transactions.

14.
15.
16.
17.
18.

Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 230 (1964) (citations omitted).
Simpson v. Union Oil Co. of Cal., 377 U.S. 13, 24 (1964).
Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Inv. Co., 320 U.S. 661 (1944).
Id. at 666.
See Abbott B. Lipsky, Jr., Current Antitrust Division Views on Patent Licensing

Practices,50 ANTITRUST L.J. 515, 517-24 (1982).

19.

Richard Gilbert & Carl Shapiro, Antitrust Issues in the Licensing of Intellectual

Property: The Nine No-No's Meet the Nineties, in BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY,

MICROECON.
283,
286
(1997),
http://www.brookings.edu/-fmedialprojects/bpea/1997.
micro/1997_bpeamicro-gilbert.pdf [http://perma.cc/C8KN-ATXY].
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Beginning in 1981, US antitrust authorities under the Reagan
Administration changed course and rejected the "Nine No-Nos" broad
presumptions of illegality concerning patent licensing. This was not
the temporary partisan position of a conservative administration. By
the mid-1990s, an antitrust enforcement consensus had developed in
the United States that patent licensing transactions were often
efficiency enhancing and should not lightly be subjected to antitrust
prosecution. This consensus was embodied in the 1995 issuance of
joint DOJ-Federal Trade Commission (FTC) Antitrust Guidelines for
the Licensing of Intellectual Property ("1995 Guidelines"). 20 Although
the 1995 Guidelines, as their title suggests, facially encompass all
forms of intellectual property, their application has primarily centered
on patent transactions.
The 1995 Guidelines recognize that intellectual property laws
and antitrust laws share the common purpose of promoting innovation
Under the 1995 Guidelines,
and enhancing consumer welfare.
of antitrust law unless they
afoul
licensing restrictions do not run
create market power greater than the power the IP holder could have
exercised without licensing (e.g., by refusing to license and directly
producing and selling products covered by its patents). In short, a
firm that possesses monopoly power ex ante may use licensing to
extract monopoly rents. The 1995 Guidelines embody three important
general principles: (1) For the purpose of antitrust analysis, the DOJ
and FTC ("Agencies") regard intellectual property as being essentially
comparable to any other form of property, (2) the Agencies do not
presume that IP creates market power in the antitrust context, and
(3) the Agencies recognize that IP licensing allows firms to combine
generally
is
and
production
of
factors
complementary
2 1 Within a relatively short period of time, the 1995
pro-competitive.
Guidelines came to be accepted as consensus mainstream US antitrust
thinking. In the Independent Ink 22 case, the Supreme Court adopted
the reasoning of those Guidelines in holding that a patent is not
presumed to convey market power for the purpose of antitrust tying
analysis.
Following FTC and DOJ hearings in the early 2000s on the
intersection of antitrust and IP, the two agencies jointly issued a

20.
LICENSING

US DEP'T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM'N, ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR THE
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/
1995),
6
(Apr.
PROPERTY
INTELLECTUAL
OF

default/files/attachments/competition-policy-guidance/0558.pdf [https://perma.cc/KRD8-S58M].
Id. at 2.
21.
Illinois Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28, 46 (2006).
22.
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report on antitrust enforcement and IP rights ("2007 Report"). 23 The
2007 Report in essence reaffirmed and expanded upon the 1995
Guidelines' general approach to the antitrust analysis of patent
licensing. 24 The 2007 Report delved in significant detail on issues
such as: unilateral refusals to license; standard setting; portfolio
cross-licenses and patent pooling; variations on IP licensing practices
(including grantbacks, non-assertion clauses, and reach-through
licensing); tying and bundling of IP rights; and contractual practices
that extend beyond the patent term (long-term exclusivity and royalty
contracts, along with bundling patents with trade secrets).25
In particular, the 2007 Report stated that antitrust liability for
mere unilateral, unconditional refusals to license a patent would "not
play a meaningful part in the interface between patent rights and
antitrust protections. '26 This formulation was in harmony with the
Supreme Court's Trinko decision, discussed previously, which held
that antitrust law strongly disfavors requiring firms to deal with third
parties. It also reinforced the general understanding that antitrust
should not be applied to interfere with the core right of patent holders
to deny third parties access to their patents.
III. ENFORCERS' RECENT ABANDONMENT OF SOUND
PATENT-ANTITRUST ANALYSIS WITH A FOCUS ON STANDARD SETTING
Unfortunately, however, federal antitrust enforcers now seem
to be departing from the policy of not undermining a patentee's
unilateral efforts to maximize returns on its patents. Enforcers have
recently sought to use antitrust and unfair competition law to
constrain patent holders' individual rights when their patents have
been incorporated into technological standards. 27
This approach
represents a marked change in emphasis from a focus on joint conduct
that restricts competition among rival technologies to a primary
concern with unilateral conduct by individual patent holders.

23.
US DEP'T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM'N, ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT AND
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: PROMOTING INNOVATION AND COMPETITION (Apr. 2007),

http://www.justice.gov/sites/defaultfiles/atr/legacy/2007/07/11/222655.pdf [http://perma.cc/7T6ZMMWV] [hereinafter 2007 Report].
24.

Id.

25.

Id.

26.
Id. at 32.
27.
See discussion of three FTC consent decrees imposing limitations on the exploitation
of such standards, infra text accompanying notes 34-39.
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A. Standard-SettingOverview
Before turning to recent US antitrust agency enforcement
initiatives regarding standard setting, a brief overview of US standard
setting generally is in order. The US government summarized key
benefits and attributes of standard setting in general-emphasizing
the US experience-in its 2014 submission on standard setting to the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD):
Industry standards are widely acknowledged to be one of the engines driving the
modern economy. Standards can make products less costly for firms produce and more
valuable to consumers. They can increase innovation, efficiency, and consumer choice;
foster public health and safety; and serve as a fundamental building block for
international trade. Standards enable virtually all the products we rely upon in modern
society, including mechanical, electrical, information, telecommunications, and other
systems, to interoperate. The most successful standards are often those that provide
timely, widely adopted, and effective solutions to technical problems.... Standards
development in the United States may be characterized as sector based and market led.
U.S. businesses often collaborate to establish standards by working through
standard -setting organizations (SSOs) to develop a standard that all firms, regardless of
whether they participate in the process, can use in making products. [SItandards may
also be set in the marketplace where firms vigorously compete, [sometimes] in a
winner-take-all standards war to establish their own technology as the de facto
States are voluntary
standard.... Most standards developed and used in the United
28
consensus standards created through private sector leadership.

In sum, US standards, which are developed by the private
sector and cover a multitude of products, are socially beneficial. They
reduce production costs, solve technical problems, enhance health and
safety, spur international trade, and promote vigorous competition
among products.
B. TraditionalAntitrust Concerns with Standard Setting
Despite their significant benefits, however, standards set
through SSOs may also pose competitive harm. Specifically, as the
DOJ and FTC explained in their 2007 IP Report:
Firms that choose to work through an SSO to develop and adopt standards may be
competitors within their particular industry. Thus, agreement among competitors
about which standard is best suited for them replace consumer choice and the
competition that otherwise would have occurred in the market to make their product the
consumer-chosen standard.... Recognizing that collaboratively set standards can
reduce competition and consumer choice and have the potential to prescribe the
direction in which a market will develop, U.S. courts have been sensitive to antitrust

Submission to Working Party No. 2 on Competition and Regulation, United
28.
States-Intellectual Property & Standard Setting, Organization for Economic Co-operation &
8,
2014),
(Dec.
116
(2014)
DAF/COMPJWD
Doc.
[OECD]
Development
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/attachments/us-submissions-oecd-other-international(internal
[https://perma.cc/6QB2-KAWL]
competition- foralstandardsettingus.oecd.pdf
quotation marks and footnote citations omitted).
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issues that may arise in the context of collaboratively set standards. They have found
antitrust liability in circumstances involving the manipulation of the standard-setting
improper use of the resulting standard to gain competitive advantage
process or 2the
9
over rivals.

In short, the fact that competitors work closely together in
standard setting makes the risk of collusion among rivals-who have
a common interest in favoring themselves and excluding technologies
offered by potential competitors-a central focus of antitrust concern.
C. The Recent Antitrust Enforcement Focus on Hold- Up by Patent
Holders
In recent years, antitrust agencies have turned their focus
away from collusion and toward wrongful exploitation of patent-based
monopoly power (so-called "hold-up") allegedly generated in
connection with standard-setting activity. As agencies have noted,
"Commonly, businesses collaborate to establish [technology] standards
by working through standard setting organizations . . . to develop a
standard that all firms, regardless of whether they participate in the
process, then can use in making products. ' 30 While standards may
promote efficiencies in production, they also eliminate preexisting
competition among similar technologies that were candidates to be
adopted by the SSOs. Holders of standard essential patents (SEPs)
that cover "winning" technologies selected for inclusion in a widely
adopted standard3 ' suddenly acquire additional market power. This
market power increment is reflected in higher royalty licensing rates
(and other more beneficial licensing terms) received by SEP holders.

29.
2007 Report, supranote 23, at 34-35 (citation omitted).
30.
Id. at 33. The following brief discussion of the threat of hold-up and licensing SSO
licensing commitments directed at hold-up draws upon the 2007 Report. Id. at 33-48. For a more
recent FTC perspective on SSOs and hold-up, see, e.g., Oversight of the Enf't of the Antitrust
Laws: HearingBefore the Subcomm. on Regulatory Reform, Commercial and Antitrust Law of the
H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 113th Cong. 9-14 (2013) (statement of the Fed. Trade Comm'n),
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/Files/documents/public-statements/prepared-statement-federaltrade-commission-oversight- enforcement-antitrust-laws-presented]
131115antitrustlawtestimony.pdf [https:/perma.ccL3EH-A9FF]; Standard Essential Patent
Disputes and Antitrust Law: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust, Competition Policy &
Consumer Rights of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 113th Cong. (2013) (statement of the Fed.
Trade Comm'n), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/publicstatements/preparedstatement-federal-trade-commission-concerning-standard-essential-patent-disputesand/I30730standardessentialpatents.pdf [https://perma.cc/3ZNL-NRFV].
31.
I refer here to a standard that is utilized by a large proportion of firms that compete
downstream in a particular product or service market (or markets). The downstream firms offer
key standardized features that consumers demand (features without which they cannot be viable
competitors) and compete by differentiating their offering on non-standardized attributes (for
instance, the individualized "look" or "feel" of a particular smartphone that differs among
manufacturers).
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This surge in market power arises because producers that
manufacture according to the standard may no longer turn to
substitute technologies if they are dissatisfied with the terms offered
to them by the SEP holders. In effect, the SEP holders enjoy a special
"hold-up premium" above and beyond that attributable to the inherent
superiority of their technology due solely to the fact that licensing
negotiations take place after a standard has been adopted, rather than
before (when competition among technologies constrained market
32
power).
In order to forestall opportunistic hold-up of technology
implementers, many SSOs have required SSO members to agree to
license their SEPs on "reasonable and non-discriminatory" (RAND) or
"fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory" (FRAND) terms. 33 In three
litigation settlements, the FTC has imposed conditions on SEP holders
that allegedly failed to adhere to previously made FRAND
commitments.
In N-Data,34 a firm made a price-specific licensing commitment
(a $1,000 one-time paid-up license) within an SSO, the Institute of
Electrical and Electronic Engineers (IEEE), and then subsequently
transferred its patent interests with a subsequent transferee (N-Data)
demanding far higher royalties. An FTC majority found that the
transferee had engaged in patent hold-up by exploiting the
incorporation of patented technology into a standard and reneging on
a known commitment made by its predecessor in interest. 35 This
opportunistic activity harmed competition by raising prices for an
to
subvert the IEEE's
entire
industry
and threatening
standard- setting process in a way that endangered the viability of
standard setting in general. In settling these charges, N-Data agreed

32.
Prior to the adoption of a standard, patentees will compete among themselves for
the benefit of having their technology incorporated in a standard and thus will offer lower
royalties to prospective licensees than will be available after a winning technology is selected.
33.
"RAND" (the term typically used in the United States) and "FRAND" (the term
typically employed outside the United States) are widely treated as equivalent and
interchangeable terms. SSOs' RAND/FRAND requirements do not spell out precisely the
meanings of those terms, which must be determined on a case-by-case basis among private
parties through negotiations, alternative dispute resolution, or litigation. As of now, there is no
universally agreed-to definition of the terms.
34.
Negotiated Data Sols., LLC, F.T.C. File No. 051-0094 (Jan. 23, 2008),
[http://perma.cc/8B99-VH6V];
Dissenting
http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/O510094/index.shtm
Statement of C. Majoras, Negotiated Data Sols., LLC, F.T.C. File No. 051-0094 (Jan. 23, 2008),
Dissenting
[http://perma.ccIBE5T-NCDZ];
http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/O510094/index.shtm
Statement of Comm'r Kovacic, Negotiated Data Sols., LLC, F.T.C. File No. 051-0094 (Jan. 23,
2008), http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/O510094/index.shtm [http://perma.cc/5MAJ-WRYH].
35.
See Negotiated Data Sols., LLC, F.T.C. File No. 051-0094 (Jan. 23, 2008),
http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0510094/index.shtm [http://perma.cc/8B99-VH6V].
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not to enforce the patents in question unless it first offered a $1,000
one-time paid-up license.
In Robert Bosch GmbH,36 an FTC majority found that SPX
Service Solutions U.S. LLC harmed competition by reneging on a
commitment to license SEPs on FRAND terms by seeking injunctions
against willing licensees of those patents. As part of a settlement with
the FTC, Bosch, which acquired SPX, agreed not to pursue claims for
injunctive relief with respect to those patents.
In Motorola Mobility LLC and Google Inc.,37 the FTC alleged
that Google, which had acquired Motorola Mobility, harmed
competition by reneging on Motorola Mobility's commitment to license
its SEPs on FRAND terms-specifically by seeking or threatening
injunctions against firms that were willing to accept FRAND licenses.
In its settlement with the FTC, Google agreed not to seek injunctive
relief before (1) providing a potential licensee with written offer
containing all material terms required for an SEP license and
(2) providing the potential licensee with an offer of binding arbitration
to determine specific licensing terms. 38 The consent decree also
provided potential licensees with a voluntary negotiation framework
that they could opt into and identified several narrow circumstances
when Google would be allowed to seek an injunction (such as if the
potential licensee refused to accept terms set by a court or an
39
arbitrator).
Unlike the FTC, the DOJ has not yet brought enforcement
actions arising out of broken standard-setting pledges, but it has
investigated acquisitions of patents (joint conduct, not unilateral

36.
See Analysis of Agreement Containing Consent Orders to Aid Public Comment,
Robert
Bosch
GmbH,
F.T.C.
File
No.
121-0081
(Apr.
24,
2013),
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2013/04/121126boschanalysis.pdf
[http://perma.cc/5QKL-CUW4]; Dissenting Statement of Comm'r Maureen K. Ohlhausen, Robert
Bosch GmbH, F.T.C. File No. 121-0081 (Apr. 24, 2013) (discussing those portions of the consent
relating
to
alleged
conduct
by
the
respondent
involving
SEPs),
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2012/11/1211 26boschohlhausenstatement.
pdf [http://perma.ccBNZ5-D9EE].
37.
See Analysis of Proposed Consent Order to Aid Public Comment, Motorola Mobility
LLC
&
Google
Inc.,
F.T.C.
File
No.
121-0120
(Jan.
3,
2013),
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2013/01/
130103googlemotorolaanalysis.pdf [http://perma.cc/8YVX-85D6];
Dissenting Statement of
Comm'r Maureen K. Ohlhausen, Motorola Mobility LLC & Google Inc., F.T.C. File No. 121-0120
(Jan. 3, 2013), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/public-statements/statementcommissioner-maureen-ohlhausenl130103googlemotorolaohlhausenstmt.pdf
[http://perma.cc/DK5M-AZ54].
38.
See Decision and Order, Motorola Mobility LLC & Google Inc., F.T.C. File No. 1210120
at
*7-8
(July
23,
2013),
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/
cases/2013/07/130724googlemotorolado.pdf [https://perma.cc/QNU8-PQ3M].
39.
See id. at *8-9.
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conduct) subject to licensing commitments related to standard-setting
processes. 40 Moreover, there are indications that the DOJ shares the
philosophy underlying the three FTC consents. A senior DOJ official
has stated that the DOJ will "continue to look at" whether an
antitrust violation may occur when a FRAND-encumbered SEP owner
exercises the monopoly power that it acquired through participation in
a standard-setting process in breach of the SEP owner's FRAND
41
commitment.
These enforcement agency initiatives are highly problematic.
The FTC settlements have been criticized by a former FTC Chairman
as failing to meet the standard for antitrust liability; 42 by a former
FTC Commissioner as fundamentally undermining core patent
rights; 4 3 and by a sitting FTC Commissioner as lacking in regulatory
humility and raising institutional conflicts with the US International
Trade Commission, 44 as offering ambiguous guidance to businesses,
creating doctrinal confusion, and for failing to meet the standard for
Federal Trade Commission Act violations. 45 Furthermore, there is
good reason to question the real-world validity and incidence of the
hold-up, which is the key underlying justification for the FTC consents

See Press Release, Antitrust Div., US Dep't of Justice, CPTN Holding LLC and
40.
Novell Inc. Change Deal In Order to Address Department of Justice's Open Source Concerns
(Apr. 20, 2011), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/cptn-holdings-llc-and-novell-inc-change-deal-orderaddress-department-justices-open-source [http://perma.cc/GZ8V-V2CT]; Press Release, US Dep't
of Justice, Statement of the Department of Justice's Antitrust Division on its Decision to Close
its Investigations of Google Inc.'s Acquisition of Motorola Mobility Holdings Inc. and the
Acquisitions of Certain Patents By Apple Inc., Microsoft Corp. and Research In Motion Ltd. of
Certain Nortell Networks Corp. Patents(Feb. 13, 2012), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/statement[http://perma.cc/
department-justice-s-antitrust-division-its-decision-close-its-investigations
H9CG-TEDW].
See Renata B. Hesse, Deputy Assistant Att'y Gen., Antitrust Div., US Dep't of
41.
Justice, IP, Antitrust and Looking Back at the Last Four Years, Remarks at the Global
Competition Review, 2nd Annual Antitrust Law Leaders Forum (Feb. 8, 2013),
http://www.justice.gov/atr/file/518361/download [http://perma.cc/E8YE-LD3V].
See Dissenting Statement of Chairman Majoras, Negotiated Data Sols., LLC, supra
42.
note 34.
See Joshua D. Wright, Comm'r, Fed. Trade Comm'n, Does the FTC have a New IP
43.
Agenda?, Remarks at the 2014 Milton Handler Lecture: "Antitrust in the 21st Century" (Mar. 11,
2014), https://www.ftc.gov/systemlfiles/documents/public-statements/288861/14031l ipagenda.pdf
[https://perma.cc/P7LK-VTFX ("[Bosch and Motorola] depend upon the [incorrect] assumption
that seeking injunctive relief, without more, is itself anticompetitive" and thus represent a
"notorious rejection of ... the basic economic proposition that the exercise and enforcement of
presumptively valid property rights promotes economic exchange.").
See Analysis of Agreement Containing Consent Orders to Aid Public Comment,
44.
Robert Bosch GmbH, supra note 36; Dissenting Statement of Comm'r Maureen K. Ohlhausen,
Robert Bosch GmbH, supra note 36.
See Analysis of Proposed Consent Order to Aid Public Comment, Motorola Mobility
45.
LLC and Google Inc., supra note 37; Dissenting Statement of Comm'r Maureen K. Ohlhausen,
Motorola Mobility LLC and Google Inc., supra note 37.
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and the DOJ expression of enforcement interest in standard setting
and SEPs. 46 For example, firms engaged in standard-setting activity
may implicitly threaten to retaliate in future negotiations against
firms that seek to engage in hold-up (for example, by bypassing their
technologies in future standard-setting rounds)-a factor that would
discourage unreasonable licensing demands in the first place. But
even assuming SEP hold-up may exist and may cause harm, applying
47
antitrust in such situations appears unnecessary.
Patent and contract law doctrines are fully adequate to
preclude anticompetitive hold-up schemes. First, a court will not
enter an anticompetitive injunction in favor of an SEP holder given
the Supreme Court's holding that a traditional "public interest"
standard must be satisfied before such relief is ordered. 48 Second,
contract law doctrine allows legitimate, commercially motivated
contract renegotiations, but it does not permit the sort of improper,
opportunistic contract demands that are an inherent aspect of
hold-ups.

49

Even assuming, however, that contract remedies are

imperfect and enforceable contracts may not always be present, a
variety of equitable doctrines-including estoppel, unclean hands,
custom, and unjust enrichment-may be invoked to combat
opportunistic behavior, including hold-up. 50 In short, because patent
law, contract law, and equitable remedies are well tailored to
effectively deal with hold-up, application of antitrust here is
unnecessary.
Invocation of antitrust principles does, however, impose
substantial costs due to possible welfare-inimical error. 51 An SEP
holder might very legitimately seek an injunction rather than

46.
See generally J. Gregory Sidak, The Antitrust Division's Devaluation of
Standard-EssentialPatents, 104 GEO L. J. ONLINE 48 (2015), http://georgetownlawjournal.org
files/2015/05/Sidak-AntitrustDivisionsDevaluationofStandard-EssentialPatents1.pdf
[http://perma.cc/B5Z8-7JNNI.
47.
The following summary analysis of the case against antitrust intervention to cure
hold-ups draws upon Thomas A. Lambert, Respecting the Limits of Antitrust: The Roberts Court
Versus the Enforcement Agencies (Heritage Found. Legal Memorandum No. 144, 2015),
http://thf-media.s3.amazonaws.com/2015/pdf/LM144.pdf [http://perma.ccfRC3V-FFUB].
48.
See eBay v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006).
49.
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 89, 175-76 (Am. LAW INST. 1981); see
also Uniform Commercial Code § 2-209 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM'N 2012).
See, e.g., Henry E. Smith, Property as Platform: Coordinating Standards for
50.
Technological Innovation, 9 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 1057 (2013).
The importance of error cost considerations in guiding antitrust enforcement is
51.
widely recognized. The seminal article is Frank H. Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 TEX.
L. REV. 1 (1984) (noting that in tight of the inevitable social losses from incorrect antitrust
decisions ("error costs") and the costs of assessing liability under the antitrust laws ("decision
costs"), courts and regulators should interpret and enforce antitrust's amorphous prohibitions so
as to minimize the sum of error and decision costs).
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monetary compensation against a judgment-proof infringer or against
a "bad faith" infringer that had arbitrarily rejected fair and legitimate
licensing orders to threaten litigation and illegitimately gain leverage.
Alternatively, an SEP holder negotiating demands might reflect a
response to
unanticipated
changes
in relevant
legitimate
circumstances, including marketplace conditions. In sum, given these
legitimate efficiency explanations, caution should be exercised to avoid
over-deterring SEP holders' efforts to obtain injunctions or renegotiate
contracts. Interjecting antitrust into RAND or FRAND controversies
(which, as we have seen, can be handled appropriately through other
legal means) ignores this sound counsel and may prove affirmatively
harmful.
Indeed, precluding SEP holders from obtaining remedies to
vindicate their property rights could subject them to "reverse hold-up"
by licensees that desire to obtain SEP technology for an
inappropriately
low rate-a rate that provides suboptimal
compensation for SEPs. In other words, if technology implementers
know that they will be guaranteed access to SEPs at low rates with no
threat of future exclusion if sued, they hold all of the negotiating
cards. SEP holders may have little choice but to offer licenses at rates
below those that would be set through normal bilateral bargaining.
This tactic will reduce current SEP holders' incentive to commit their
technologies to future standard-setting negotiations. This behavior, in
turn, will tend to degrade the quality of future standards and the new
products and services they enable.
Until now, the government has led antitrust investigations of
SEP activity. But what if private plaintiffs enter the litigation game?
Successful private antitrust actions result in treble damages to
account for the fact that most antitrust misconduct, such as price
fixing, occurs in secret and is thus not successfully prosecuted; optimal
deterrence requires a damages multiplier.5 2 For antitrust violations
that do not occur in secret, however, the multiplier tends to create
over-deterrence. That would be the outcome here: injunction actions
and license renegotiations by SEP holders occur in the open, so
applying a damages multiplier in private litigation to account for the
(nonexistent) difficulty of detection will over-deter injunctive actions
53
and renegotiations.
See Richard Craswell, Deterrence and Damages: The Multiplier Principle and its
52.
Alternatives, 97 MICH. L. REV. 2185 (1999), for an overview (and critique) of the law and
economics of deterrence and damages multipliers.
Over-deterrence is a concern even if the antitrust action is brought under Section 5
53.
of the FTC Act, which cannot be privately enforced by plaintiffs seeking treble damages. A
successful Section 5 action may give rise to copycat private actions under Sections 1 or 2 of the
Sherman Act or under privately enforceable state antitrust laws (including so-called little FTC
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The conclusion that government antitrust intervention is
inappropriate here is underscored by the fact that private disputes
regarding FRAND are now going through the courts and have reached
the appellate level. In December 2014, the Federal Circuit set forth
an extensive contract and patent law analysis of FRAND.5 4 In
particular, it held that a "patent holder should only be compensated
' 55
for the approximate incremental benefit derived from his invention.
In the context of a FRAND obligation, the court further held that "the
royalty for SEPs should reflect the approximate value of that
technological contribution, not the value of its widespread adoption
due to standardization." 56 Given the Federal Circuit's influence as the
sole appellate court for patent-based causes of action, the court's
analysis-perhaps supplemented in future appellate holdings-may
be expected to clarify the meaning of FRAND without the need for
costly and inappropriate antitrust intervention.
Using antitrust to police hold-up stemming from injunctive
actions or renegotiation efforts by SEP holders provides little marginal
benefit (given that other legal doctrines are better tailored to police
bad behavior here) while imposing significant marginal cost given the
likely over-deterrence resulting from potential antitrust liability.
Respect for the limits of antitrust 7 would call for the enforcement
agencies to stay their hand in this context.5 8
Regrettably, however, the antitrust enforcers seem to be
interjecting themselves even more broadly into standard-setting
controversies. On February 2, 2015, the DOJ issued to the world's
largest high tech trade association, the IEEE, a "business review
Acts, many of which may be enforced in private actions). See Bruce H. Kobayashi & Joshua D.
Wright, The Limits of Antitrust and Patent Holdup: A Reply to Cary et al., 78 ANTITRUST L. J.
505, 509 n.15 (2012).
54.
Ericsson, Inc. v. D-Link Sys., Inc., 773 F.3d 1201 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
55.
Id. at 1233.
56.
Id.
57.
See Easterbrook, supra note 51.
58.
The European Court of Justice (ECJ) seems to have adopted an "intermediate
position" on the ability of a dominant firm to seek an injunction on its SEP without incurring
liability under European Union competition law-specifically, Article 102 of the Treaty on the
Formation of the European Union, which forbids the "abuse" of a "dominant position." On July
16, 2015, the ECJ issued a judgment in response to the request of a German court as to the
conditions under which Huawei's SEP-based suit for an injunction and damages against ZTE
Corporation would constitute such an abuse. The ECJ held that a dominant firm does not "abuse
its dominant position" by bringing an SEP-based injunctive action provided that the firm: (1)
alerted the alleged infringer and, after the infringer expressed its willingness to conclude a
FRAND licensing agreement, (2) gave the infringer a specific, written offer for such a license
(including royalty terms), but (3) the infringer nevertheless continued to use the patent and
failed to "diligently" respond to the offer in good faith. See Case C-170/13, Huawei Techs. Co. v.
ZTE Corp., 2015 http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?docid=165911&doclang=en
at * 71 [http://perma.ccHJW3-YU9J].
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letter"59 ("2014 IEEE Letter") stating that it would not bring an
antitrust enforcement action against a proposed new IEEE patent
policy (subsequently adopted on February 8). The new IEEE policy
intervenes in bilateral licensing negotiations in a most unfortunate
manner. 60 It requires a patentee to provide the IEEE with a letter of
assurance waiving its right to seek an injunction against an infringer
in order to have its patents included in an IEEE standard. It also
specifies that an analysis of comparable licenses for purposes of
determining a FRAND royalty can only consider licenses for which the
SEP holder has relinquished the right to seek and enforce an
injunction against an unlicensed implementer. Moreover, under the
change, an SEP holder may seek an injunction only after having fully
litigated its claims against an unlicensed implementer through the
appeals stage-a process that would essentially render injunctive
relief highly impractical, if not futile.
In addition, the new policy precludes an SEP holder from
conditioning a license on reasonable reciprocal access to non-SEP
patents held by the counterparty licensee. Finally, the new policy
straitjackets licensing negotiations by specifying that royalty
negotiations must be based on the value of the "relevant functionality
of the smallest saleable Compliant Implementation that practices the
Essential Patent Claim."6 1 This requirement ignores the fact that the
benefit that a claimed invention provides to an end product-which is
often key to determining reasonable licensing terms-depends on the
specific patent and product to be licensed, not necessarily the
"smallest saleable compliant implementation" (for example, a small
microchip).
All told, the new IEEE policy not only creates an imbalance
between the rights of innovators (whose SEPs lose value) and
implementers of technologies, but also interferes in market processes
by inappropriately circumscribing the terms of licensing negotiations.
The policy's provisions encourage potential licensees to insist on
anticompetitive terms that monopsonistically reduce returns to SEP
holders below the competitive level-terms that, if agreed to jointly by

Letter from Renata B. Hesse, Acting Assistant Att'y Gen., US Dep't of Justice, to
59.
Michael A. Lindsey (Feb. 2, 2015), http://www.justice.gov/atr/response-institute-electrical-andelectronics-engineers-incorporated [http://perma.cc/FJ86-JKEH].
See Press Release, Inst. of Elec. & Elec. Engrs [IEEE], Statement Regarding
60.
Updating of its Standards-Related Patent Policy (Feb. 8, 2015), https://www.ieee.org/
aboutlnews/2015/8 february_2015.html [https://perma.cc/XMU2-93N7].
(2015)
6.1
BYLAws
STANDARDS
BOARD
IEEE-SA
61.
IEEE,
http://standards.ieee.org/develop/policies/bylaws/sect6-7.html [http://perma.cc/A9RY-25R2].
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the licensees, could well be deemed a per se illegal monopsony buyers'

62
cartel (with the potential licensees buying license rights).
Astonishingly, the senior DOJ official who signed the 2014
IEEE Letter stated in a press release that "IEEE's decision to update

its policy ... has the potential to help patent holders and standards
implementers to reach mutually beneficial licensing agreements and

to facilitate the adoption of pro-competitive standards."63

This

statement ignores the fact that the devaluation of SEPs may be
expected to lessen investment in standard setting and thereby degrade
standards-an anticompetitive, not a procompetitive, result. The
statement also is at odds with a joint DOJ-US Patent and Trademark

Office (USPTO) policy statement issued in January 2013, which
provides:
[The] DOJ and [USPTO] strongly support the protection of intellectual property rights
and believe that a patent holder who makes such a F[RAND commitment should receive
appropriate compensation that reflects the value of the technology contributed to the
standard. It is important for innovators to continue to have incentives to participate in
standards-setting activities and for technological breakthroughs in standardized
technologies to be fairly rewarded.64

Furthermore, the 2014 IEEE Letter fails to address even the
issue of "monopsony" that the new policy inherently creates. This
shortcoming would earn a poor grade on an antitrust examination.
A more detailed examination of the 2014 IEEE Letter

underscores its shortcomings. The letter eschews analyzing the risk
that, by sharply constraining expected returns to SEPs, the IEEE's
new policy may disincentivize technology contributions to standards,

harming innovation. The letter focuses on how the IEEE's policy may
reduce patentee "hold-up" by effectively banning injunctions and

highlighting three factors that limit royalties-basing royalties on:
(1) the value of the smallest saleable unit, (2) the value contributed to
that unit in light of all the SEPs that practiced the unit, and
(3) existing licenses covering the unit that were not obtained under
threat of injunction. The letter essentially ignores, however, the very
real problem of licensee "hold-out" by technology implementers who

62.
See Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v. Am. Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219 (1948)
(price fixing by purchasers per se illegal); see also, e.g., Todd v. Exxon Corp., 275 F.3d 191, 201
(2d Cir. 2001) ("[A] horizontal conspiracy among buyers to stifle competition is as unlawful as
one among sellers.").
63.
Press Release, Office of Pub. Affairs, US Dep't of Justice, Department of Justice Will
Not Challenge Standards-Setting Organization's Proposal to Update Patent Policy (Feb. 2, 2015),
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/department-justice-will-not-challenge-standards-settingorganizations-proposal-update-patent [http://perma.cc/438N-2GY2].
64.
US DEP'T OF JUSTICE & US PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, POLICY STATEMENT ON
REMEDIES FOR STANDARDS-ESSENTIAL PATENTS SUBJECT TO VOLUNTARY F/RAND COMMITMENTS

8 (2013), http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/290994.pdf [http://perma.cc/Q67X-DRB6].
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may gain artificial bargaining leverage over patentees. Thus, there is
no weighing of the new policy's anticompetitive risks against its
purported procompetitive benefits. This is particularly unfortunate
given the absence of hard evidence of hold-up.65 Also, by forbidding
injunctive actions prior to first-level appellate review, the new IEEE
policy effectively precludes SEP holders from seeking exclusion orders
against imports that infringe their patents under Section 337 of the
Tariff Act. This move eliminates a core statutory protection that helps
shield US patentees from foreign anticompetitive harm, further
debasing SEPs-a reality the letter fails to address. Furthermore, the
letter fails to assess the possible competitive harm firms may face if
they fail to accede to the IEEE's new policy.
Finally, and most disturbingly, the 2014 IEEE Letter ignores
the overall thrust of the new IEEE policy, which is to encourage
potential licensees to insist on anticompetitive terms that reduce
returns to SEP holders below the competitive level. Such terms, if
jointly agreed to by potential licensees, could well be deemed a
buying license
monopsony buyers' cartel (with the potential licensees
66
rights) subject to summary antitrust condemnation.
The 2014 IEEE Letter stands in marked contrast to two
previous DOJ business review letters that also dealt with SSO policies
designed to preclude SEP hold-up-a 2006 letter issued to the
VMEbus (Versa Module Europa bus) International Trade Association
(VITA) ("2006 VITA Letter") and a 2007 letter issued to IEEE ("2007
IEEE Letter").6 7 Completely unlike the 2014 IEEE Letter, neither the
2006 VITA Letter nor the 2007 IEEE Letter micromanaged licensing
negotiations or implicitly facilitated collusion. Thus, the earlier
letters plainly avoided the serious potential anticompetitive problems
associated with the 2014 IEEE Letter, as revealed by the specifics of
the earlier letters and policies.
Indeed, the Federal Circuit in its Ericsson v. D-Link decision, discussed above (main
65.
text accompanying notes 54-56, supra), denied jury instructions citing the possibility of hold-up,
given D-Link's failure to provide any evidence of hold-up.
See, e.g., Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v. Am. Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219
66.
(1948) (finding allegations that sugar beet refiners colluded to fix a uniform price to be paid to
growers of sugar beets stated a cause of action for violation of the Sherman Act); Todd v. Exxon
Corp., 275 F.3d 191 (2d Cir. 2001) (finding systematic information exchanges plus evidence that
defendants relied on information derived therefrom in setting salaries supported a claim for
violation of the Sherman Act).
See Letter from Thomas 0. Barnett, Assistant Att'y Gen., US Dep't of Justice, to
67.
http://www.justice.gov/
2006),
30,
(Oct.
Skitol
A.
Robert
[http://perma.cc/
sites/defaultfilesatrlegacy2006/10/31/219380.pdf
4FT8-JLZKI [hereinafter 2006 VITA Letter]; Letter from Thomas 0. Barnett, Assistant Att'y
2007),
30,
(Apr.
A.
Lindsay
to Michael
of
Justice,
Dep't
US
Gen.,
[http://perma.cc/
http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/atrlegacy/2007/O4/30/222978.pdf
NA57-4YZ7] [hereinafter 2007 IEEE Letter].
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The 2006 VITA policy required ex ante disclosures by SSO
members of certain key SEP licensing terms (maximum price terms
and most restrictive non-royalty terms) but, unlike the 2014 IEEE
policy, it did not impose rules guaranteed to yield very low prices, nor
did it interfere with VITA members' litigation rights. The DOJ made
it very clear that the 2006 VITA Letter did not countenance
anticompetitive behavior:
Working group members do not set actual licensing terms.... [Tihe patent holder and
each prospective licensee will negotiate separately, subject only to the maximum terms
set forth in the patent holder's original, unilateral declaration. Any attempt to use this
process as a sham to cover horizontal price fixing likely would result in antitrust
liability, as an illegal agreement under Section 1 of the Sherman Act, but the
put in place by VITA appear to promote efficiency if they are followed and
restrictions
68
enforced.

In short, the DOJ clearly warned VITA against collusion
among competitors on negotiating terms and stressed that individual
negotiations, based on broad-based negotiating freedom (limited only
by individually and unilaterally set offer terms), would not pose
competitive problems.
The 2007 IEEE policy differed from the 2006 VITA Policy in
that it gave an SEP holder more options, specifically: (1) providing no
SEP licensing term assurances, (2) stating that it held no SEPs,
(3) committing not to assert its SEPs against implementers of the
standard, (4) committing to license on RAND terms, and
(5) committing to maximum price terms or most restrictive non-price
terms. 69 The IEEE would then post the assurances, or lack thereof, on
its website. If a patentee chose the fifth option, IEEE working groups
could take this into account in assessing the relative costs of
technologies that might be included in a standard. The 2007 IEEE
Letter stressed that these provisions would encourage patent holders
to compete to offer the most attractive combination of technology and
licensing terms. 70 In short, far from straitjacketing negotiations and
driving down prices (unlike the approach of the 2014 IEEE policy that
was lauded in the 2014 IEEE Letter), the 2007 IEEE policy enhanced

Gerald F. Masoudi, Deputy Assistant Att'y Gen., Antitrust Div., US Dep't of Justice,
68.
Antitrust Enforcement and Standard Setting: The VITA and IEEE Letters and the "IP2" Report,
Remarks at the Spring Meeting of the Am. Intellectual Prop. Law Ass'n 4 (May 10, 2007)
http://www.justice.gov/atr/speech/antitrust-enforcement-and-standardomitted),
(footnotes
setting-vita-and-ieee-letters-and-ip2- report [http://perma.cc/GVP2-Z3VC] [hereinafter Masoudi
Remarks].
See id.
69.
"[The ability to make such commitments could generate . . . benefits as patent
70.
holders may compete to offer the most attractive combination of technology and licensing terms."
2007 IEEE Letter, supra note 67, at 10.
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competition by improving the information in the marketplace
available to both the framers of standards and licensing negotiators.
The new and extremely narrow FTC and DOJ fixation with
alleged SEP-related monopoly single firm standard-setting-related
abuses, in plain disregard of serious risks of collusion, is also at odds
with modern US antitrust's primary concern with "horizontal"
restrictions among direct competitors. The US Supreme Court singled
71
out horizontal collusion as the "supreme evil of antitrust" in Trinko,
while making it clear that monopolization cases typically raise greater
difficulties. The three major Supreme Court antitrust cases featuring
standard setting-Radiant Burners,72 Hydrolevel,73 and Allied
Tube 74-all involved collusion among SSO participants and agents to
exclude disfavored competing technologies or products from receiving
SSO imprimatur. These situations involved very little risk of error or
disincentivizing
efficient behavior, unlike the recent SEP
monopolization scenarios that have preoccupied US enforcement
agencies.
Supporters of the focus on alleged single-firm patent abuses in
standard setting might nevertheless contend that reducing returns to
individual patents will increase welfare by constraining the exercise of
market power. Alternatively, they might argue that at the very worst,
the new antitrust initiatives involve a targeted intervention in a
corporate fight over rents between technology sellers and technology
Such
implementers that has no broad welfare implications. 75
justifications miss the mark. Although some academics have raised
concerns about "poor" patent quality and "probabilistic" patents,
recent comparative scholarship supports the proposition that, all else
being equal, countries with stronger patent protection tend to have
strong rates of economic growth and innovation. 76 In light of that
scholarship and the lack of substantial empirical support for a cutback
in existing levels of patent protection, this Article contends that recent
actions by US antitrust enforcers that tend to weaken patents are
71.
Verizon Commc'ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 408
(2004).
72.
Radiant Burners, Inc. v. Peoples Gas Light & Coke Co., 364 U.S. 656 (1961).
Am. Soc'y of Mech. Eng'rs v. Hydrolevel Corp., 456 U.S. 556 (1982).
73.
74.
Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc., 486 U.S. 492 (1988).
75.
If the latter were the case, of course, the application of antitrust enforcement to
private activity lacking substantial welfare implications would involve a waste of scarce
government resources that could have been better deployed investigating clearly harmful
behavior, such as collusion among competitors.
76.
See generally Alden F. Abbott, Abuse Of DominanceBy Patentees: A Pro-Innovation
Perspective, 14 ANTITRUST SOURCE 1, 8-10 (2014) (summarizing recent scholarship),
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/abalpublishing/antitrustsource/octl4_full-source.auth
checkdam.pdf [http://perma.cc/3293-R5E7].
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ill-considered. Why are they ignoring this literature? One can only
speculate, but it is possible that current patent-antitrust policy
reflects a general administrative disdain for strong property rights
and a belief in the superior ability of enlightened technocrats to
The current administration's
micromanage the economy.
philosophical orientation may be reflected in other actions that may
lead to further constraints on patent rights, such as investigations of
patent assertion entities, which are beyond the scope of this Article.
Finally, US antitrust policy changes do not operate in a
vacuum. Major foreign competition enforcers, such as China and
Korea, are by nature more interventionist than US agencies, and
recently they have undertaken a variety of intrusive investigations
and enforcement measures directed at patents. 77 The continuing
apparent denigration of patent rights by US antitrust authorities can
only encourage them to continue along this path-a result that may
further undermine innovation and welfare. Chinese officials' public
references (albeit less than fully accurate) to FTC settlements
78
restricting SEPs are but one example of this sad phenomenon.
IV. NEW DOJ-FTC IP-ANTITRUST POLICY STATEMENT
If the FTC and DOJ truly want to promote economic welfare
more generally and consumer welfare in particular, they should issue
a new IP-antitrust policy statement announcing a change in direction.
The statement should emphasize that the agencies will devote
their limited IP-related enforcement resources primarily to the area
where consumer harm is greatest-restrictions among competing
technologies. Such restrictions are the principle focus of the 1995
Guidelines and the historic central concern of antitrust enforcers with
standard setting. The statement could explain that alleged efforts by
a single SSO participant to extract excessive monopoly returns on its
SEPs following standards "lock-in" are far less likely to harm the
competitive process and should not be an enforcement priority. The
statement could note that SSOs, whose members include sophisticated
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businesses, are perfectly capable of adopting procedures (such as ex
ante disclosure of patents and FRAND licensing commitments) that
are well suited to avoid exploitation of their processes. Also, the
statement could stress that ex post private law remedies (contract,
patent, and equity) are available to disgruntled licensees that believe
they have been unfairly harmed through patentee deception or
through a violation of licensing commitments. For these reasons, the
statement could conclude that explicit adoption by US enforcers of an
exclusive focus on collusion (including collusion to exclude rival
technologies) in standard setting would reduce expected antitrust
error costs and hopefully would have a salutary effect on foreign
competition officials' development of enforcement norms in this area.
In addition, the statement should disavow FTC and DOJ policy
support for SSO policy changes, such as the February 2015 IEEE
pronouncement-policies that threaten to undermine the value of
patents by specifying the precise terms of licensor-licensee
negotiations. In so doing, the statement should reaffirm the 2013
DOJ-USPTO Joint Statement's recognition of the importance of
properly compensating SEP holders to reward and incentivize
innovation.
V. CONCLUSION
Promulgation of a new DOJ-FTC IP-antitrust policy statement
should reject the current emphasis on alleged single-firm SEP abuses
and focus instead on restrictions among competing patentees and their
technologies. Such a change would be beneficial by reducing antitrust
error costs in standard-setting analyses; lessening uncertainty; and
promoting innovative, welfare-enhancing patent arrangements. It
also, of course, would require a significant change in current FTC and
DOJ IP-antitrust philosophy.

